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Abstract 
To resolve a moral dilemma created by the rescue of carnivorous species from exploitative situations who 
must rely on the flesh of other vulnerable species to survive, Cheryl Abbate applies the guardianship 
principle in proposing hunting as a case-by-case means of reducing harm to the rescued animal as well 
as to those animals who must die to supply food. This article counters that Abbate’s guardianship 
principle is insufficiently applied given its objectification of deer communities. Tom Regan, alternatively, 
encouraged guardians to think beyond individual dilemmas and adopt a measure of systemic 
reconstruction, that being the abolition of speciesist institutions (The Case for Animal Rights; Empty 
Cages). In addition, politics of non-vegan pets and vote-with-your-dollar veganism are addressed as 
relevant moral dilemmas that highlight the limited utility of individual decision-making within a larger 
system of speciesism. It is argued that guardians are obliged to work toward the abolition of speciesism, 
while guardians may, in the meantime, support carnivorous refugees with animal agriculture byproducts 
given the reality of sellercontrolled foodways. 
This journal article is available in Animal Studies Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asj/vol7/iss1/8 
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guardianship principle in proposing hunting as a case-by-case means of reducing harm to the rescued animal 
as well as to those animals who must die to supply food. This article counters that Abbate’s guardianship 
principle is insufficiently applied given its objectification of deer communities. Tom Regan, alternatively, 
encouraged guardians to think beyond individual dilemmas and adopt a measure of systemic reconstruction, 
that being the abolition of speciesist institutions (The Case for Animal Rights; Empty Cages). In addition, 
politics of non-vegan pets and vote-with-your-dollar veganism are addressed as relevant moral dilemmas that 
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meantime, support carnivorous refugees with animal agriculture byproducts given the reality of seller-
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When one vulnerable being requires the killing of other vulnerable beings in order to flourish, 
how will this conflict be resolved? Philosophers often adopt an individualist approach by 
examining moral dilemmas case-by-case to provide practical advice for moral agents. In Tom 
Regan’s famous lifeboat scenario, for instance, he suggests weighing the quality of life, 
awareness, and subjectivity associated with individuals whose interests come into conflict (The 
Case for Animal Rights, 285-286). In his imagined conflict between dogs and humans on a boat too 
small, drowning neither a human nor a dog for the survival of the others on board would be 
desirable, but humans, he supposes, have greater opportunities for satisfaction. This greater 
appreciation for life suggests that humans would be better served by salvation. For Regan, if 
some groups must suffer and die in a true situation of conflict, let it be those with fewer 
opportunities for satisfaction.  
In ‘How to Help when It Hurts: The Problem of Assisting Victims of Injustice’, Cheryl 
Abbate considers a real-world dilemma of this kind that is encountered by anti-speciesist 
sanctuaries with carnivorous refugees in their care. She develops what she terms a ‘guardianship 
principle’ to argue that, in situations of moral conflict, it is sometimes justifiable to hurt one or 
more innocent subjects-of-life to the benefit of others who have been treated unjustly and are 
also innocent, subjects-of-life.i Specifically, she employs an example of large sanctuary-dwelling 
carnivores (represented by the fictional ‘Sophia,’ a lion spared from the circus industry) who 
have been horribly exploited in a human supremacist world. After a lifetime of misery, these 
animals deserve a chance to flourish. Or, more accurately, humans owe duties to assist them on 
the grounds of justice. However, the justice owed to Sophia will paradoxically require the 
regular procurement of animal flesh in order for her to survive healthfully.  
Many sanctuaries rely on the bodies of slaughtered animals purchased or donated from 
traditional human foodways, but sanctuaries are supposed to heal and shelter, not support the 
suffering of others. In such situations, how to help when it hurts? For Abbate, the answer could 
lie at the end of a rifle or bow. In line with Regan’s philosophy, if someone must die to alleviate 
the conflict, let it be the one with fewer opportunities for satisfaction. According to this liberty 
principle, Abbate reckons that free-living deer, having enjoyed a lifetime of freedom, will be less 
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harmed by death than a carnivore who has been freed from exploitation for the first time. She 
supports this proposal by supposing that deersii slated for death would be spared a life of disease 
and hardship in the wild. Injustice is the determining factor here; circus lions have been victims 
of injustice, but deers have not. At the point of killing, deers would also become victims of 
injustice, but they, having lived a free life, would be less harmed by death than lions. 
 The way in which ‘hunting’ is presented as a solution poses a number of philosophical 
problems, but sociologically speaking, it insufficiently explores the reality of modern food 
production. ‘Hunting’iii (a euphemism for violent killing) may actually cause more hurt than 
would the purchasing of slaughterhouse byproducts. This essay offers a sociological perspective 
on this particular moral conundrum, challenging the legitimacy of Abbate’s prescription for 
sanctuaries to undertake harm against free-living deer communities. First, I deconstruct 
Abbate’s application of the guardianship principle, noting that its implications for ‘hunting’ are 
circumscribed and that the objectification of deers made inherent in her solution is not fully 
acknowledged. Second, I address the sanctuary dilemma with an application of the sociological 
perspective. Sociology highlights the need to think systemically about social problems and to 
acknowledge that violence, even in the name of social justice, is problematic and always bound 
within hierarchies of power. To that effect, I will highlight the role that speciesism plays as a 
system of oppression and the ultimate problem of positioning humans (such as Sophia’s 
sanctuary operators) as guardians.  
Humans are dubiously privileged in their possession of power, resources, and ability to 
decide the fate of others. A guardianship principle that takes for granted this hierarchy 
necessarily ignores the need for system restructuring to reduce, if not eliminate, most cases of 
moral conflict. Abbate does acknowledge that humans have ‘limited knowledge about the 
mental and social lives of animals’, and that they are ‘not in a position to make comparable 
judgements about the lives of nonhuman animals from different species’, (158) but her 
guardianship principle requires just that. Most importantly, it relies on an individualistic 
analysis, failing to acknowledge the larger system in which these conflicts transpire as malleable. 
Abbate does insist that institutions producing vulnerable dependents like Sophia (such as 
circuses) should be curtailed, but this does not extend to the larger food system that produces 
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vulnerable dependents such as cows, chickens, and pigs. In other words, she inadequately 
connects entertainment-based exploitation within the larger system of speciesism and its logic 
that nonhumans are property that can be owned, used, consumed, and discarded for human 
want. This logic is sustained by animal-based food production, by far the largest source of 
nonhuman suffering and death. 
Abbate disapproves of tapping into the existing system of animal agriculture to serve the 
meal requirements of carnivorous sanctuary residents, but I argue that vegan economics could 
offer a more satisfactory solution. While traditional vegan economic theory, as Abbate applies it, 
supposes that purchasing non-vegan products will create demand, sociologically-informed vegan 
economic theory sees that producers and governments, not consumers, are the primary arbiters 
of public consumption (Carolan; Winders and Nibert: Stretesky et al.). Therefore, a plan for 
systemic restructuring would stem the manifestation of cruelty, abuse, and suffering by 
fundamentally changing how humans eat and entertain themselves. In lieu of this long-term goal, 
given that food systems are seller-controlled rather than buyer-controlled, sanctuaries may 
continue to rely on slaughterhouse products until both obligate carnivore dependents (like 
Sophia) and slaughterhouse victims cease to be produced for human wants. However, vegan 
food technology has already presented short-term solutions for obligate carnivores, and this 
avenue must be explored before the drastic measures of buying and killing Nonhuman Animals 
for food are undertaken.iv  
 
Deconstructing Abbate’s Guardianship Principle 
‘Hunting’ in the Lifeboat  
Abbate advocates the addition of her guardianship principle to Regan’s theory of Nonhuman 
Animal rights, which recognizes the inherent worth of subjects-of-life. To illustrate this 
principle, she suggests that humans, as ‘guardians’, may be able to ‘hunt’ to improve a 
carnivore’s quality of life. This tradeoff is suggested as an alternative to traditional ‘meat’ 
sources, namely animal agriculture, on the basis that free-living animals are not problematically 
used as renewable resources as are domesticated food animals (Abbate 151). That is, the system 
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of ‘hunting’ at least allows Nonhuman Animals a life of independence and liberation before 
killing, whereas agriculture keeps Nonhuman Animals in a state of suffering and oppression 
before they are dispatched. There are some key flaws associated with this position that go 
unacknowledged by Abbate and warrant response. Fundamentally, the responses presented 
herein derive from the sociological argument that the moral conflicts that concern Abbate and 
Regan are individualistic in focus and are wielded unnecessarily to justify continued systems of 
speciesism (specifically ‘hunting’).  
Abbate advances the solution of ‘hunting’ to illustrate her argument that, ‘in certain 
cases, our obligation to assist nonhuman animals who are victims of injustice appears to conflict 
with our prima facie negative duty not to harm nonhuman animals (142),’ and, that, ‘we are 
justified, under certain conditions, in overriding our prima facie duty not to harm nonhuman 
animals in order to fulfill our obligation to assist nonhuman animals who are victims of injustice’ 
(142). Abbate considers the possibility of scavenging or using ‘roadkill,’ but notes that 
sanctuaries reject these as food sources given their propensity to carry parasites and disease, thus 
‘hunting’ is examined as a practical alternative. Fundamental to Abbate’s argument is the notion 
that ‘hunting’ avoids treating free-living species as renewable resources as is the case with those 
bound for the slaughterhouse.  
The first problem with the ‘hunting’ solution thus arises out of Abbate’s concern with 
treating nonhumans as renewable resources. Over the course of her life, Sophia will require that 
perhaps hundreds of Nonhuman Animals be killed for her sustenance, indicating that deers will 
be consistently relied upon as are cows, pigs, or chickens. Abbate even advises that sanctuaries 
‘kill only a certain number of deer each year, so that the population of deer is not decimated’ 
(162), clearly acknowledging that the population must be maintained such that it can be 
perpetually available to sanctuaries. Because so many must die, it is clear that Bambi and his ilk 
would indeed be exploited as renewable resources. Abbate insists that her solution does not 
constitute a systemic exploitation, but rather a case-by-case series of individual decisions to be 
made as each sanctuary food supply runs low (161). This interpretation, however, is 
disingenuous given that deer communities invariably act as a reserve for food at any given time. 
When a historically oppressed group is imagined as a regular source of value available for 
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exploitation at the whims of structurally privileged groups (in this case, humans seeking to 
redress their wrongs), this is indicative of systemic violence, not individual decision-making. For 
that matter, sanctuaries are fully cognizant of the amount of flesh required for the average feline 
inmate. If sanctuaries are acting as guardians and thus have to decide to either kill Sophia or kill 
multiple Bambis, should they choose to become guardian to Sophia, the deers may not be killed 
at once, but the decision to kill them is made at once. Each time an obligate carnivore is taken 
in, multiple decisions to harm other animals in the future procurement of food are made in the 
one individual decision to provide sanctuary to the carnivore.  
Second, Abbate suggests that this killing can be justified as many deer communities are 
overpopulated. Overpopulation is thought to relegate forest inhabitants to a state of suffering 
which can be alleviated by execution. In fact, overpopulation rhetoric is a trope frequently 
employed by the ‘hunting’ community as a rationale for their morally questionable hobby. 
However, it is rarely acknowledged that wildlife ‘management’ departments actively control 
populations to maintain a constant supply of victims for paying customers. ‘Hunting’ inclusive 
‘management’ programs constitute a multi-million-dollar industry in America (Anderson). State 
institutions, to be sure, view deers, elks, rabbits, and other animals as renewable resources. In 
fact, the whitetail deer species had gone extinct or nearly so from large swaths of the United 
States by 1900 until active reintroduction measures resurrected their communities (Waller and 
Alverson). Abbate acknowledges this state management as an injustice but concludes that deers 
are not necessarily made worse off by this manipulation (155). Ultimately, she, too, relies on 
overpopulation as justification for the killing of deers. Rather than treating deers as individual 
rights-bearers, they are subsumed within the larger species, and it will be group size, rather than 
individual experience that will determine their fate. This advice, it should be noted, runs 
contrary to Regan’s rights-based philosophy. 
The ‘overpopulation’ argument is indeed a curious one in this age of biological 
devastation. Thousands of species in modern society are declining dramatically such that the 
‘success’ of a large animal in shrinking wild spaces indicates that their current population is 
neither natural nor accidental. It is unclear how sanctuaries that seek to capitalize on this system 
of artificial population growth can be convincingly positioned as morally absolved. More likely, 
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sanctuary narratives will only contribute to the ideological justifications propagated by the state 
and ‘hunting’ interests for continued population ‘management’ should they adhere to Abbate’s 
recommendation. Sanctuaries would benefit from the active renewal of deer communities for 
public consumption, even if their decisions to ‘hunt’ were indeed case by case as Abbate 
recommends. Nevertheless, if present ‘game’ populations are largely a product of human 
engineering, Abbate’s argument that ‘overpopulation’ is a justification for killing deers for 
Sophia’s sustenance is undercut. Deers may be infrequently confined to a feedlot or artificially 
inseminated, but they are systematically produced for human use as are cows, chickens, and pigs. 
The primary difference is that the cost of their production is outsourced to wild spaces and 
subsidized by ‘hunting’ licenses. 
Third, the notion that deers may be better off dead as Sophia’s dinner if spared from 
overpopulation and starvation is a biological inaccuracy. This inaccuracy constitutes perhaps the 
most critical chink in Abbate’s application of the guardianship principle. If it is conceded that her 
guardianship principle is also intended for the benefit of deers and is not simply reserved for 
sanctuary carnivores, then the principle falsely presumes a need for deers to be cared for in 
suggesting that they are suffering the pains of overpopulation such that they require ‘euthanasia’ 
by gunshot. Deers are biologically capable of managing their own population and will not 
reproduce when environmental conditions are unfavorable (‘hunting’ can actually disrupt this 
natural system, and ‘management’ efforts artificially encourage increased reproduction) (Miller, 
Verme). In other words, deer communities are only ‘overpopulated’ from the human 
perspective, usually when they are determined to be a nuisance in some fashion or a rationale is 
required to sell ‘hunting’ licenses. They do not necessitate the lethal ‘guardianship’ of sanctuary 
assailants. What they require is non-interference. This paternalistic decision-making relies on a 
Eurocentric, colonialist mentality by presuming that free-living species are not capable of self-
determination and then tapping that logic as rationale for systemic oppression (Wrenn).  
Abbate supports the tradeoff in her presumption ‘that there is reason to believe that 
these deer might actually be benefitted by a quick, premature death if their alternative option is 
a drawn-out death from starvation or from being hit by a motor vehicle’ (159). Yet, this begs 
the question: why should rescued big cats not themselves be killed to prevent their drawn-out 
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death from starvation? Abbate suggests that, because carnivore survivors are relatively deprived 
when compared to deers (who have lived much of their life free), they deserve to enjoy a full life 
as well. If these deers are so miserable with hunger and illness, might they not benefit from 
sanctuary themselves? How liberatory is such a life if, as Abbate describes, they are so miserable 
that death would be preferable? It is probably not advisable to begin absorbing free-living 
communities into sanctuaries, but the existence of wildlife rehabilitation centers necessitates a 
consideration of the comparable suffering potentially experienced by both deers and lions. The 
guardianship principle favors Sophia because she not only suffers, but she is a victim of injustice. 
However, it is unclear as to how a deer and a lion, both suffering, would be cognizant as to the 
source of that suffering. The awareness to the source is most likely to be experienced by 
humans, thus suggesting that the guardianship principle is human-oriented, if not human-
centered. Although Abbate maintains that that both deers and big cats have inherent value, her 
differential advice based on species identity supports the idea that deers are thought 
fundamentally expendable, and that expendability relies on human conscience. 
As an ethical matter, Abbate’s position on the expendability of deers and the 
salvageability of lions will necessitate further justification. It is telling that humans and more 
privileged species such as cats and dogs are not offered as potential sacrifices in Abbate’s 
application of the guardianship principle. Big cats may prey on deers, but they are also known to 
prey on companion animals. With millions of cats and dogs killed in ‘shelters’ across the country 
each year, the killing of cats and dogs with the ‘expert shots’ Abbate recommends (158) might 
be a more realistic option for Sophia’s dinner bowl. While companion animals are not identified 
as potential victims, she does entertain the possibility of utilizing ailing or elderly humans. She 
does not accept that humans would be acceptable substitutes, but her rationalization for sparing 
humans (that they should be given the benefit of a doubt regarding their capacity for subjectivity) 
is not extended to other species who also have capacity for subjectivity. Furthermore, while she 
dismisses disability as grounds for killing humans, she uses it as justification for killing deers in 
her advice that: ‘perhaps wildlife sanctuaries should be instructed to kill only those deer who 
will suffer a painful death, such as those who are sick, those who are malnourished, those who 
will endure brutally cold winters, or those who live in overpopulated areas’ (162). Millions of 
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humans currently face similar circumstances and might also be relieved of their suffering if we 
ascribe to this reasoning (consider Jonathan Swift’s 1729 satirical A Modest Proposal which 
encouraged poor, colonized Irish families to sell their children to privileged British consumers). 
That only traditionally devalued animals (and never humans or their ‘pets’) are designated for 
systematic killing speaks to a substantial bias within this application of the guardianship principle.  
There are a number of logistical issues that also arise from this prescription. For 
instance, what would become of rescued carnivores living in areas of the world where ‘game’ 
species as identified by Abbate are not realistically obtainable? Which species will be sacrificed in 
these instances? Abbate acknowledges that, in geographies that deer communities call home, 
sanctuaries should abide by kill caps, but she says nothing about areas absent of deer 
communities altogether. Neither does Abbate question the dangerous implications that ‘hunting’ 
has for humans and other non-target animals (including the ‘hunters’ themselves). Stalking and 
killing with high-powered equipment is dangerous for all involved. This presumes, too, that 
‘hunters’ would be able to reliably locate the injured, starving, and elderly deers that Abbate has 
slated as suitable for sacrifice, a difficult task in itself. In any case, demanding that free-living 
species ‘pay’ for the costs of human speciesism seems unfair. If violence is to be condoned to 
remedy human injustices, why should the burden not fall on humans themselves? It is unclear 
why deer families must be accountable for a crime unrelated to them except that they have been 
historically marginalized and oppressed and are thus especially vulnerable to humanity’s lethal 
reparation efforts. 
 
Deers as Persons 
The presentation of free-living animals (especially those traditionally viewed as food) as less 
morally worthy subjects-of-life, simply because they have enjoyed some degree of liberty, is an 
inconsistent maneuver in the ethical arena. Abbate determines that deers can be killed in an 
appropriate way (the details of how this gory deed will be undertaken and by whom is not 
explored in detail beyond her recommendation for a skilled executioner) in order to feed 
obligate carnivore refugees who are never given the chance to flourish as free-living deers might 
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have. Indeed, these secondary subjects are referred to in mass terms as ‘deer,’ or, equally 
objectifying, as ‘the deer’ for the majority of Abbate’s thought experiment. That deers are also 
seen as food in human society – things or products to be consumed – only underscores their 
status as objects. In perceived conflicts of interest and situations of emergency, it is generally the 
most marginalized who will suffer first and suffer the most. Objectification aggravates this 
vulnerability. Sophia and other large carnivores are at a distinct advantage as they represent 
species that are frequently granted some semblance of personhood and reverence in many 
cultures and rarely are they categorized as a normative foodstuff.  
It is problematic that sick or malnourished deers might be considered suitable victims 
because their quality of life is presumed low, but a sick or hungry lion is presumed both to be 
worth saving and worthy of killing for simply due to the intention behind that harm. Certainly, 
an ailing Bambi may have enjoyed a chance to flourish unlike that available to Sophia; perhaps 
humans owe Bambi some special consideration due to his sickness instead of using that sickness 
as a justification for execution. Indeed, the discriminatory disability politic lurking within 
Abbate’s prescription will be addressed toward the end of the article. Sickness aside, many anti-
speciesism theorists argue that free-living animals deserve some degree of guardianship as they 
are also highly vulnerable to human activities and exploitation (Donaldson and Kymlicka; Hall). 
Along this reasoning, it is questionable as to how liberated deers actually are. Their freedom to 
roam is sharply curtailed by fencing, roads, cities, and general human encroachment. Their 
ranges of motion are always determined by humans except in the most remote of areas. Is this 
restricted liberty not also a human-caused injustice?  
It is also unclear how Abbate’s proposal to kill old, suffering, and diseased deers to 
meet the Sophia’s dietary requirements (159) will be an improvement over the ‘roadkill’ 
solution already rejected by sanctuaries due to health concerns. Abbate cites parasites and ticks 
as reason not to utilize these carcasses (148), but even healthy deers are laden with parasites and 
ticks, so much so that environmental scientists use ‘hunter’ kills as samples in measuring a 
region’s parasite load (Baer-Lehman et al.). After all, parasites and ticks do not simply 
materialize at the point of death; they are part of the ecosystem. Climate change has been 
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creating an increase in parasitic attacks on free-living animals as well (Léger et al.), and this, too, 
would complicate the utility of ‘hunting.’  
In Abbate’s scenario, both illness and liberty are simultaneously commissioned to 
construct deers as a resource to meet human needs (specifically, the human need to rectify 
human-caused harms to carnivores), underscoring their marginalized status in the system. As 
Regan famously allows for a million dogs to go overboard in his metaphorical lifeboat, so, too, 
does Abbate cast off a million deers. What these philosophies fail to examine sufficiently, 
however, is the system from which this conflict manifests. The metaphorical dangerous ocean 
and the small boat traversing it, both products of human supremacy, are presumed an 
unfortunate tragedy instead of a malleable system that can be restructured to prevent or reduce 
moral conflicts. Anti-speciesism employed by a strong vegan ethic can keep all sentient beings 
safely on shore, with little threat of drowning, starving, or ‘hunting’, at least at the hands  
of humans. 
 
The Importance of Thinking Systemically 
It is unavoidably a paternalist and human supremacist action for volunteers, activists, and 
theorists to undertake the privilege of determining the worth and eligibility of rights for various 
species, well-intentioned though it may be. Although Abbate concedes that playing the ‘worth’ 
game is problematic given humanity’s limited understanding of other animals’ experiences, the 
ample attention her theory dedicates to attempting to do just that points to the inherent problem 
of humans appointing themselves as judge, jury, and executioner for nonhumans. This point has 
been addressed by ecofeminists, who posit that environmental ethics miss the forest for the 
trees, so to speak, by focusing on moral dilemmas rather than examining root problems (Kheel). 
While moral dilemmas are useful in determining action in situations of conflict, too often they 
exhibit a narrow outlook that obscures the larger environmental forces that initially manifest the 
conflict and constantly shape the field in which the dilemma operates.  
While guardianship is sometimes a moral obligation that humans owe to some other 
animals who are dangerously dependent and vulnerable in a human supremacist system, 
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guardianship is in and of itself a manifestation of a speciesist power differential. It relies on a 
hierarchy of authority and worth, with humans as guardian subjects and other animals positioned 
beneath them as the guarded objects to be manipulated. While Abbate acknowledges some of the 
objections I have outlined herein, it remains her assertion that obligate carnivores who have been 
victimized by humans be granted special consideration. The difficulty of her argument lies in its 
focus on single-issues created by an oppressive system without offering a substantial critical analysis 
of the system itself. So long as the system remains unaddressed, human guardians will be burdened 
with unending moral dilemmas, few of which will be addressed satisfactorily for all parties 
involved. For this reason, Regan is heavily invested in an abolitionist position, as are legal 
philosophers (Hall) and sociologists (Nibert; Torres; Wrenn). In the abolitionist perspective, 
dismantling speciesist institutions, rather than seeking to reform and repair them, is positioned 
as a prerequisite to the meaningful consideration to nonhumans. 
 
False Consumer Agency in a Non-vegan Food System 
Abolition will be a long time coming, however, and Sophia still needs to eat. Human ‘guardians’ 
must, in the meantime, determine how to address a problematic system without becoming lost 
in a sea of endlessly emerging single-issue conundrums. It is my position that utilizing flesh 
products from industrial animal agriculture would be a sufficient, if temporary, solution to the 
conflict of interest identified by Abbate. This may seem counterintuitive, but this position is 
based on the reality of speciesism as a system and locus of control. Abbate presumes that feeding 
farmed ‘meat’ to Sophia would support the unjust killing of farmed animals. This concern aligns 
with that of the Nonhuman Animal rights movement, which advocates reducing consumer 
demand for animal products. The assumption is that the speciesist supply will decline 
accordingly and harm will be reduced. Ethicists might therefore be concerned about increasing 
demand (and thus supply) if sanctuaries were to feed industrial animal agriculture products to 
their carnivorous residents.   
However, this presumption falsely identifies consumers (sanctuaries included) as the 
perpetuators of the speciesist food system. In his 2013 publication Meatonomics, David Robinson 
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Simon demonstrates that the ‘supply and demand’ argument to reducing harm to food animals is 
overly simplistic given the industrial and political control of markets. Corporate elites control 
both supply and demand, making consumer power minimal within a system that is designed to 
promote and protect speciesist consumption patterns. Government checkoff programs provide 
millions of dollars each year to ‘meat’ and dairy industries to promote their product through 
advertisements, scientific research, and the legitimacy granted by government support. These 
industries are also granted considerable tax breaks and enjoy limited regulation. The United 
States Department of Agriculture, which is responsible for promoting ‘meat’ and dairy, is also 
charged with creating nutritional advice for the country, creating misleading health 
requirements for the populace. Finally, food disparagement regulations, ‘ag gag’ laws, and the 
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act all work to legally suppress efforts to challenge animal 
agriculture. The result is that ‘meat’ and dairy are forced on American consumers in ever-
growing quantities under the coercive effect of artificially low prices, heavy advertising, and 
misleading nutritional advice (Winders and Nibert). Americans consume large quantities of 
animal products for the same reason they consume large quantities of unhealthy processed foods: 
these items saturate foodways to such an extent that they are practically inescapable. 
Over-confidence in consumer agency is well-documented in sociological explorations of 
food and environmental reform. Food systems analysts have referred to the consumer-based 
approach to challenging problematic food production as the ‘defetishization thesis’, as it is 
premised on the belief that commodity fetishism can be undermined by withdrawing consumer 
support (Gunderson). In the case of vegan advocacy, it is presumed that the vegan boycott will 
defetishize animal products, thus lending to a decline in their production. However, market 
realities thwart such a strategy. Economic boycotts are no match for the capitalist system’s well-
oiled treadmill of production. This treadmill is artificially maintained in high operation with the 
full support of the state. A whole body of psychological research also supports that consumer 
‘choices’ are artificially manufactured through heavy, targeted marketing (including 
neuromarketing) to sustain capitalism’s relentless demands (Yarrow). When American markets 
saturate, the industry invents new products or uses to absorb ever-greater quantities of animal 
matter. They also expand into new markets, as is now happening in Asia and Africa. 
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Social movements have particular cause for concern due to the high potential for 
capitalist ideologies to subsume radical agendas for social change. Bitch Media founder Andi 
Zeisler has documented this trend in the feminist movement, while others have identified it in 
the gay rights movement (Chasin) and in the environmental movement (Wallis). Caring 
consumers are encouraged to ‘vote with their dollar,’ under the premise that a groundswell of 
consumer demand will change systems, without recognizing that systems may simply exploit this 
fervor to increase sales of similar products only labeled as ethical. The Nonhuman Animal rights 
movement, for instance, has invested at least two decades into the denunciation of ‘meat’ and 
dairy consumption, only to be faced with a major spike in the popularity of ‘humanely’ 
produced animal products (Scrinis et al.). Corporations ultimately remain in control, 
reabsorbing consumer desires in the maintenance of existing food systems. In fact, corporations 
are known to act ahead of consumer demands such that they will be positioned to anticipate and 
control the shape of the dialogue and regulations (Dauvergne and Lister).  
Ultimately, the consumer model for change optimistically places the power in the hands 
of individuals, overlooking the disproportionate power retained by corporations. Consumption 
is constructed and controlled and is only minimally a consequence of free choice. The consumer 
model presumes a fair playing field, yet, as sociologists and movement leaders have emphasized, 
consumer choices are not likely to feed structural change. Instead, they fall in line with 
traditional capitalist channels, the same channels that uphold social inequality. Vegan sociologist 
Bob Torres distills these issues in his advice to activists, ‘You cannot buy the revolution’ (123). 
The system described here is highly unlikely to be influenced either way by individual 
cases of moral conflict as manifested in the handful of carnivore-harboring sanctuaries in human 
society. As such, utilizing industrial animal agriculture products to feed carnivorous nonhuman 
victims of human exploitation is not likely to aggravate the injustice already done to food 
animals, who, regardless of sanctuary procurement decisions, will continue to suffer and die so 
long as systemic conditions remain unaltered. What I wish to emphasize is that animal 
agriculture exists primarily to serve humans. It is human capitalists who protect it, not the 
nutritional needs of tiny populations of sanctuary refugees. In fact, more consumable ‘meat’ is 
disposed of as garbage than is fed to individuals like Sophia. Food justice nonprofit Feeding 
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America reports that 72 billion pounds of perfectly edible food is wasted each year.v A good 
portion of this is animal protein. North American retailers waste about 4% of their ‘meat’ 
products, while consumers waste 12% of ‘meat’ and 17% of dairy they purchase (Gunders). 
Abbate makes mention of edible surplus flesh destined for disposal as a potential resource. This 
might act as a more reliable source if tapped appropriately. Indeed, a network of university 
campuses in the United States systematically redirects surplus unwanted food to food pantries in 
their communities. Sanctuaries might feasibly employ a similar program.  
 
Lessons to Learn from Non-vegan ‘Pets’ 
In the grand scheme of animal agricultural production, sanctuaries may not present a significant 
market for farmed ‘meat’ as Abbate fears, but the institution of ‘pet-keeping’ might. The moral 
quandary of feeding ‘meat’ to ‘pets’ offers additional support for the need to embrace a systemic 
perspective. Researcher Hank Rothgerber considers this conflict as it relates to non-vegan cats 
who live as companion animals to vegans. Many vegan activists argue that human ‘guardians’ 
first have a moral obligation to switch a domesticated obligate carnivore in their care to a 
fortified vegan diet. If this is unachievable, however, humans will still have a moral obligation to 
feed their carnivorous companions, even if it entails purchasing industrialized animal agriculture 
products. Rothgerber’s findings indicate that vegans cope with the guilt of supporting non-vegan 
production by medicalizing their cats’ need to eat flesh (that is, keepers’ will rationalize that cats 
biologically require flesh to flourish). If vegans can justify supporting non-vegan cats with 
farmed animal flesh, why would sanctuaries be unable to justify supporting non-vegan refugees 
with the same? Both vegans and sanctuaries have pledged to help other animals and do not wish 
to cause harm. There is no evidence to support the idea that vegans are interested in hiring 
‘hunters’ to kill for their ‘pets,’ and there seems little reason to expect such an extreme solution 
for sanctuaries either. Perhaps the difference between purchasing slaughterhouse byproducts 
formulated into ‘pet’ food and ‘hunting’ deer communities lies in the romanticized notion that 
lions and other big cats must feed on ‘wild caught,’ ‘hunted’ prey to serve their primal essence. 
‘Meat’ is ‘meat,’ however, whether it comes from a slaughterhouse or a forest. To presume that 
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big cats must dine on ‘hunted’ food to achieve satiation only reinforces speciesist and irreverent 
stereotypes about big cats and their domesticated relatives. 
In any event, focusing on the carnivore’s requirements for survival in a human-
controlled and human-benefiting system is to individualize what is inherently a systemic problem. 
The conflict of interest embodied in non-vegan ‘pets’ and sanctuary residents is a false one 
because it is one that humans create. It is not inevitable, but rather a changeable conflict that 
could be resolved if humans were not to engage in the unnecessary exploitation of other animals. 
So long as the oppressive system continues to exploit cats as ‘pets’ and cows, pigs, chickens, and 
others as ‘food’, these conflicts will continue to arise. Presuming that these conflicts are 
unavoidable and formulating analyses that lack a systemic critique ignores the fundamental 
problem and misses an important opportunity to advocate for significant reduction in suffering 
through the resistance to speciesism. Of course, moral dilemmas will not cease to exist in a 
vegan utopian future. Caring for Nonhuman Animals, for instance, is responsible for 
considerable environmental damage (Okin), and some Nonhuman Animals will still require 
human care after the abolishment of ‘pet-keeping’ and ‘zoo-keeping.’ However, conflicts would 
be dramatically lessened should the systematic exploitation of other animals for food and 
entertainment be curtailed.  
In the meantime, an application of the guardianship principle that identifies the needs of 
entertainment refugees as cause for ‘hunting’ misses the most wide-reaching solution in failing 
to think systemically. Purchasing ‘meat’ from cows, pigs, and chickens pulls from an existent 
system of harm, whereas ‘hunting’ creates additional harm. ‘Meat’, dairy, and eggs fed to 
Nonhuman Animals in human institutions primarily derive from food systems designed for 
human consumption. First, humans nurture a speciesist society that purpose-breeds carnivorous 
companion animals and large cats, both of whom are used for entertainment purposes. Their 
existence in human society is not inevitable, and their existence in it can be manipulated. 
Second, and this is a point not acknowledged by Abbate, the speciesist society in which all live is 
supported by industrial animal agriculture for human consumption purposes. Byproducts of this 
industry are sold as Nonhuman Animal food to improve profitability. Companion animals (and 
entertainment animals) are products of speciesism, just as ‘meat’ and ‘dairy’ are products of 
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speciesism. The production of both is morally problematic and symptomatic of the larger system 
of capitalist oppression. Rather than negotiate within the structure by initiating new lines of 
oppression, taking advantage of preexisting oppression is preferable, assuming that this strategy 
transpires in the service of the loftier goal of societal restructuring. Again, sanctuary purchases 
are not evidenced to increase demand, as animal agriculture artificially gluts the market with the 
help of government subsidies. Billions of pounds also go to waste. 
 
A Vegan Systemic Change 
Because a vegan world is a long time coming, it is tempting to look for shortcut compromises. 
For instance, Abbate suggests the utilization of in-vitro ‘meat’ (also known as ‘clean meat’ or 
‘lab grown meat’) should it become commercially viable, but this, like her ‘hunting’ option, also 
unsuccessfully attempts to shuffle oppressions while leaving the problematic system itself intact. 
In-vitro ‘meat’ relies on animal agriculture for base materials, entails vivisection, and 
symbolically normalizes oppressive behavior toward other animals (Cole and Morgan).  
The ‘pet’ food industry, in the meantime, has already developed nutritionally-sound 
plant-based diets proven to healthfully sustain cats (Wakefield et al.). Explains veterinarian 
Andrew Knight:  
For cats, as for all other species, the key requirement is that their diets be nutritionally 
complete and balanced. It is also essential that they be provided in sufficiently palatable 
and bioavailable forms. There is absolutely no scientific reason why diets comprised 
entirely of plant, mineral, and synthetically based ingredients cannot meet all of these 
requirements, and several commercially available diets indeed claim to do so. (512) 
If the technology already exists to sustain cats healthfully without resorting to ‘hunting’ or 
supporting animal agriculture, it follows that resources and research might be better invested in 
developing tastier and more affordable products for the large appetites of big cats. In a meta-
analysis of research conducted on the nutritional suitability of plant-based companion animal 
food that was conducted in tandem with a survey of a dozen producers, Knight and Leitsberger 
have determined that vegan diets can be suitable for felines, big cats included, although regular 
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urine acidity checks are recommended. It has been documented that caretakers can successfully 
sustain big cats. For instance, Little Tyke, a lion cub who refused to eat the flesh provided her, 
was raised instead on grains and dairy (Westbeau). Until vegan products reach a satisfactory 
level of palatability and accessibility, an even better alternative to purchasing or repurposing 
flesh from animal agriculture would be to at least provide a partially plant-based meal plan for 
big cats as was the case with Little Tyke. 
Veganism offers a long-term strategy for alleviating these unfortunate, but predictable 
conflicts. To be clear, the limited control that citizens have over supply chains in a corporate-
controlled state means that veganism will necessitate more than a simple abstinence on the part 
of individual consumers. The exploitation of nonhuman animals is a direct consequence of 
economic conditions, but abstaining from consumption is primarily important only as a political 
protest as it relates to other animals. This is because, as explained above, consumer choice is not 
especially well-suited to dismantling the speciesist system given governmental and industrial 
control. Therefore, abstinence must be engaged in in tandem with an active effort to dismantle the 
economic system that perpetuates this conflict of interest. A guardianship principle that fails to consider 
social and material restructuring will inevitably contend with an endless stream of hungry 
Sophias and painful moral compromises to adjudicate. Abbate may be critical of  
maintaining sanctuaries as permanent solutions to species inequality, but she offers no such 
economic analysis. 
Sanctuaries surviving on the outskirts of this system are hardly to be blamed so long as 
they are actively engaged in challenging the system as well. Subsequently, I argue that Abbate 
prematurely rejects the justifiability of feeding industrial animal agriculture products to 
carnivorous domesticates and refugees. Her suggestion of introducing ‘hunting’ to sanctuary 
services increases harm to vulnerable free-living nonhumans and perpetuates a system of 
oppression, but using industrial products of animals already destined for death in a human 
supremacist system is not likely to increase harm given the minimal control consumers actually 
have over economic trends and supply chains. Human exploitation of Nonhuman Animal bodies 
is always objectionable, but the utilization of byproducts is significantly less harmful than 
‘hunting’ because it capitalizes on harms that will be committed regardless of sanctuary choice. 
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If sanctuary consumption were found to measurably increase the killing of Wilbur, Daisy, and 
other food animals, then it would warrant further examination. The reality of corporate control 
over the Western food system and the glut of animal products it forces on society, however,  
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makes this unlikely. Existent vegetarian or vegan alternatives must also be investigated. Surely, 
the procurement of plant-based, carnivore-friendly foodstuffs will be no less cumbersome than 
would be the establishment of a ‘hunting’ regimen.  
 
A Sanctuary in the System 
Finally, the focus on sanctuary sheltering over systematic restructuring illustrates the problem of 
mitigating conflicts of interest in an inherently unequal social structure without advancing a 
means of overhauling that structure. Sanctuaries are designed to offer asylum to refugees in an 
oppressive world, but, without addressing the structural problem of speciesism, they become 
limited sites of resistance and maintain symbolic value only, offering respite for an infinitesimally 
small percentage of nonhuman survivors. It should be considered that Abbate’s concession that 
sanctuaries are in of themselves good and worth (temporarily) preserving has also been criticized 
by vegan theorists. These spaces recreate an idealized and romanticized relationship with other 
animals, often harkening on imaginations of caring farmers, rolling fields, and content 
nonhuman residents living on the premises of their own free will. In fact, sanctuaries are, as 
Donaldson and Kymlicka identify, total institutions, which maintain a system of full control over 
nonhuman inmates. As such, they replicate human dominance by relegating Nonhuman Animals 
to the whims of human guardians. In a bid to increase donations and visibility, many sanctuaries 
invite the public to spectate. Consent is not possible given that the inmates are restricted and 
confined to at least some extent, and, while some sanctuaries offer room to roam and hide, 
some degree of human contact is usually expected. In many cases, Nonhuman Animals have no 
recourse but to endure the daily stress of forced human interaction. Visitors, especially children, 
routinely disregard the personal space of the beleaguered animals on display.  
While it may be unpleasant to acknowledge, it should be considered that many visitors 
of sanctuaries are of the same mindset of those who patron ‘zoos’ and circuses. Comments one 
captive animal law enforcer, ‘It seems that we desperately want to believe that we can both be 
ethical and still enjoy the thrill of getting up close and personal with a wild animal’ (Winders 
162). Even sanctuaries have difficulty avoiding circumventing this relationship of dominance. 
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While the educational value may be considerably greater and the goal of the sanctuary may be to 
improve the condition of Nonhuman Animals, the relationship remains the same: human subject 
as the viewer and nonhuman objects as the viewed. Some sanctuary operators have expressed 
concern about the potential consequences of granting humans permission to spectate without the 
guilt: ‘the “feel good” view of captive wildlife sanctuaries could also serve as a way for people to 
normalize and feel better about captivity, rather than acknowledging its inherent limitations for 
the animals’ (Doyle 74). From this perspective, it should be considered whether or not Sophia’s 
sanctuary residence is truly in her favor, or if it is instead designed to meet human interests. 
The public’s positive association with sanctuaries also sustains an industry of ‘zoos’ and 
pseudo-sanctuaries that purport to offer refuge for Nonhuman Animals while actively breeding 
or otherwise exploiting them for a variety of profit-making ventures (Doyle, Winders). Many of 
these facilities have come under fire for the abysmal living conditions they provide. For those 
sanctuaries which take up arms against free-living deer communities slated as ‘food,’ their status 
as a ‘sanctuary’ is even more suspect. Far from ‘ethically responsible’ as Abbate describes it 
(164), such a system would be complacent with systemic oppression. Researchers have also 
identified that big cats (and other wide-ranging carnivores) demonstrate the highest levels of 
psychological distress in captivity, leading to the conclusion that they are, ‘inherently likely to 
fare badly in zoos and similar establishments’ (Clubb and Mason 474). Indeed, animal 
behaviorists point specifically to their inability to range and hunt as risk factors for distress 
(Kroshko et al.). For a number of reasons, namely the legalities of releasing big cats into the 
environment to forage and the low likelihood that refugees from the entertainment industry 
would be equipped to hunt successfully, sanctuaries are ill-prepared to provide a good quality of 
life for big cats. Abbate does recognize this point in arguing that sanctuaries are not ideal, but 
she does hold that they remain functional for educational purposes, although the ability for 
sanctuaries to achieve this is, as outlined above, debatable. Explains Abbate:  
It is not enough [ . . . ] for animal sanctuaries to be content with providing so-called 
restitution to nonhuman animals who have been harmed. Animal sanctuaries should seek 
to educate visitors about the innocent blood that must be shed in the course of rescuing 
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of obligate carnivores and they should remind the public that the mere existence of 
animal sanctuaries is indicative of a moral tragedy. [ . . . ] 
Hopefully, the recognition that fulfilling the duty to assist obligate carnivores comes 
with an enormous cost will inspire wildlife sanctuaries to aim at their own obsolescence, 
for instance by drawing awareness to the inherently unjust treatment of nonhuman 
animals such as the use of nonhuman animals in circuses or the selling of ‘exotic’ animals 
for ‘pets,’ which necessitate the existence of wildlife sanctuaries in the first place. 
(Abbate, personal communication, December 21, 2017).  
Thus, sanctuaries are argued to be insufficient for prolonged use, but precisely sufficient for 
achieving justice for Nonhuman Animals via the spectacle of suffering lions and the harming of 
deers, both of which are maintained as teaching tools. The wellbeing of the animals involved is 
not centered so much as is the reception of the presumed human audience. 
 
Ableist Rhetorics 
Sanctuaries must therefore negotiate living quarters, visitor access, and tour narratives to ensure 
that the public’s learning experience is consistent with anti-speciesist values, while also 
contending with the inherently deleterious nature of confinement for big cats. Abbate’s premise 
that rescued big cats living in sanctuaries are finally enjoying ‘freedom’ is unsupported by 
behavioral science. Subsequently, it should be considered that free-living deers likely experience 
quality of life higher than that of well-fed rescued cats. According to Abbate’s reasoning and 
Regan’s prescription for coping with situations of moral conflict, both of which grant 
precedence to subjects-of-life who more greatly appreciate life, would it not be the case that 
deers’ lives would be better saved instead of those of big cats who suffer in captivity whether or 
not they have access to ‘meat’? Both lions (as survivors of the entertainment industry) and deers 
(as targets for ‘hunting’) experience injustice after all.  
This point requires a critical examination of the relationship between ‘well-being’ and 
right to life in the animal ethics discourse. What it means to be ‘well’ is ultimately subjective, 
but, historically, able-body-privileging institutions (including medicine, science, ‘zoos,’ and 
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sanctuaries) have determined the parameters of wellness with oppressive consequences. The 
disabled community has been subject to a variety of horrific injustices because disabled persons 
have been determined to appreciate their lives less than the able-bodied. Ethicist Peter Singer 
has even suggested that a disabled life is not worth living (Lewiecki-Wilson). All humans and 
nonhumans are subject to temporary disability at some point in their lives, and most will 
experience prolonged or even chronic disability as well. Even if using disability as a justification 
for killing was not ableist, it would not be very useful given that disability is so widespread. Not 
surprisingly, vegan disability scholars have soundly criticized the philosophies of Regan and 
Singer that position cognitive or physical impairment as evidence to a life less worthy (Taylor). 
Suggesting that illness or disease are grounds for the destruction of big cats or deers implies a 




This paper has addressed Abbate’s guardianship principle as it is applied to conflicts of interest 
arising from human supremacy. Specifically, she identifies the moral dilemma created by 
rescuing large cats from abusive entertainment industries for the purpose of offering them a 
well-deserved restful life in a sanctuary. These cats must eat, and the guardianship principle 
allows that the strategic and mindful killing of sick, old, hungry, or otherwise vulnerable free-
living animals who have enjoyed liberty and relative freedom from human harm is justifiable 
given the extreme harm that was unfairly faced by those animals exploited for entertainment. 
These cats, Abbate contends, deserve a shot at a happy life, while some deers must be shot at to 
provide it. Nonhuman Animals killed for food in the slaughtering system, meanwhile, are 
rejected as appropriate resources under the presumption that sanctuary purchases would 
increase the demand for slaughter and thus increase the number of individuals suffering and 
dying. Deers are differentiated in that they are supposedly not to be treated as renewable 
resources and are not victims of injustice. 
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This article first deconstructed inaccurate presumptions about ‘hunting’ presented in 
Abbate’s argument, namely, that some free-living ‘game’ species are not already products of 
systemic human exploitation, that ‘hunting’ can be accomplished without extreme pain or 
danger to targeted and non-targeted individuals, and that ‘game’ species are suffering such that 
they require ‘euthanasia’ at the hands of hired assassins. Second, this article revisited an 
alternative that Abbate rejects, that being the acquiring of ‘meat’ from animal agriculture to feed 
obligate carnivores in sanctuaries. Abbate’s rejection is based on the false presumption that 
consumers ‘vote with their dollar,’ and, thus, sanctuaries would increase harm to farmed 
animals through the procurement of ‘meat’ for their inmates. However, the reality of Western 
food systems prevents meaningful consumer impact on supply chains, thus alleviating moral 
agents from the fear that the animal products purchased for carnivorous dependents will increase 
suffering in slaughterhouses. ‘Meat’ and dairy production is artificially high and is forced into the 
food system regardless of consumer desires.  
Sanctuaries would be better morally positioned to take advantage of animal agriculture 
to support dependent carnivorous refugees given that the system is elite-controlled, not 
consumer-controlled. To illustrate this argument, the nourishment of non-vegan ‘pets’ was 
presented. Animal-based ‘pet’ food creates a conflict of interest on a much larger scale than 
animal-based sanctuary rations. Many vegans, however, are satisfied in feeding their ‘pets’ non-
vegan diets as they persist in their goal of anti-speciesism. The large amount of edible ‘meat’ and 
dairy waste produced in the United States each year was also revisited as an appropriate source 
of nutrition, thus circumventing the potential that purchasing animal products may increase the 
killing of farmed animals, however small that potential may be. Lastly, the case of Little Tyke 
and scientific advancements in vegan cat food demonstrate that sanctuary residents might be 
reasonably sustained on a plant-based diet. 
This paper argued that addressing moral dilemmas by relying on ‘hunting’ or 
slaughterhouses was insufficient. Feeding obligate carnivores from slaughterhouse byproducts 
was advocated based on the premise that animal agriculture is minimally impacted by consumer 
choices, but it was also advanced as an argumentative tool to address the need to think beyond 
individual conflicts to acknowledge the role of systems. Abbate advocates ‘hunting’ under the 
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mistaken belief that ‘hunting’ is not already a systemic form of exploitation and that sanctuaries 
would only employ it in individual cases. Likewise, her position is also premised on the 
assumption that the animal agricultural system is supported by a sum of individual choices. Both 
‘hunting’ and slaughtering, however, are embedded into the social structure; using flesh 
procured from hunting will not avoid this systemic participation. Nonhuman Animals are killed 
in slaughterhouses regardless of sanctuary feeding choices, but sanctuaries moving to the 
‘hunting’ model will create a measurable increase in speciesism by specifically killing deers to 
feed sanctuary inmates (and likely non-target species, humans included, given the highly 
dangerous nature of ‘hunting’). If both deers and farmed animals are, in fact, treated as 
renewable resources in human society, it is preferable that sanctuaries not effort themselves to 
increase the death toll by ‘hunting.’ Slaughterhouse products are at least regulated and, in the 
interest of sanctuary carnivores, more sanitary. 
It is argued that a guardian would be better positioned to make the best of already 
existent ‘meat’. However, leaving the system intact would not address the dilemma either. The 
system itself must be attacked so that the number of animals killed and in need of rescue will 
gradually lessen and cease to exist in appreciable numbers. Such a strategy would entail 
largescale collective action and the political reform of agricultural management practices to 
increase democratic access to decision-making in food supply chains. With power removed from 
corporations and redistributed among consumers, systemic change can be realized. Thinking 
systemically also requires a critique of sanctuaries, which are demonstrated to perpetuate 
speciesist attitudes and behaviors. It also requires attention to disability politics. The focus on 
individually-experienced illness and disability to justify harm is disingenuously relegated to case-
by-case guardianship deliberations given the historic, systematic oppression of disabled bodies 
which invariably shapes ethical decision-making. 
Typical of oppressive systems, speciesism stifles the imagination for alternatives. It also supports 
a false reality in which current structural arrangements are presumed natural or unavoidable. As 
a result, conflicts of interest perpetuate, and proposed solutions remain in line with prevailing 
epistemologies of inequality. This paper encourages a critical reassessment of the status quo 
speciesism that typically shapes solutions to conflicts of interest. For sanctuaries with an interest 
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in applied philosophy that Abbate rightly champions, plant-based alternatives should be 
explored. In the meantime, conventionally sourced ‘meat’ from animal agriculture is the 
preferred short-term adaptation. Most importantly, sanctuaries and their supporters must also 
relegate resources to systemic change. The facilitation of a vegan world can reduce the political 
and cultural demand for animal agriculture and animals as entertainment, thus curtailing future 
painful moral dilemmas. A guardianship principle that guards some at the expense of other, 
more vulnerable and equally sentient beings, is not sound. 
  




i More precisely, this principle is explained as such: ‘Provided that all those involved are treated 
with respect, and assuming that no special considerations obtain, a guardian is obligated to harm 
other innocents when doing so is required to avoid making a vulnerable and dependent victim of 
injustice at least as worse-off as the innocents so harmed are made’ (Abbate 2016, 152). 
ii I intentionally refrain from mass terms to honor the individuality of those who are often 
obscured with abstract terms. 
iii Euphemisms such as ‘hunting’ and ‘meat’ will be placed in quotation marks to denote their 
problematic usage and to resist their ability to normalize oppression. 
iv I intentionally capitalize the term Nonhuman Animals to denote their status as a distinct 
demographic identity. 
v See http://www.feedingamerica.org/our-work/our-approach/reduce-food-waste.html 
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